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1.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Statement of the Facts.

This is an appeal from a denial of attorney fees under sections 12-117 and
12-121, Idaho Code. Respondent Eastern Idaho Public Health District ("EIPHD"),
formerly District Seven Health Department ("District Seven") (hereafter "EIPHD") is a
separate governmental entity organized pursuant to IDAHOCODE5 39-401

B.

In

1996, appellant Sunnyside Industrial & Professional Park, L.L.C. ("SIPP") applied for
and obtained a permit from EIPHD to build an individual sub-surface sewage disposal
and tank suitable for the use of one or two commercial buildings, not to exceed 300
gallons per day. Agency Record ("AR), Petitioners' Exh. C. EIPHD later inspected the
tank, determined it was in substantial compliance with the permit, and lifted sanitary
restrictions. AR, Petitioners' Exh. D. SIPP and appellant Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc.
("Sunnyside Utilities") (hereafter collectively "Sunnyside") thereafter sold multiple
commercial lots in their subdivision, providing sewer services to approximately 11
commercial buildings on the septic system. AR, Doc. 16, f[ 6.
Idaho Code 5 39-414(2) granted EIPHD a general power to "do all things
required for the preservation and protection of public health." A Memorandum of
Understanding ("MOU") between the Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ)
and EIPHD identified their respective duties regarding septic tanks. Record ("R"),p.
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105-06. EIPHD was given authority over individual systems such as the one for which
Sunnyside obtained a permit, while DEQ retained general authority over central systems,
defined as "any system which receives blackwaste or wastewater . . . from more than two
(2) dwelling units or more than two (2) buildings under separate ownership." R. p. 38.
Although Sunnyside's system was unlawfully connected to 11 commercial buildings, it
had never been approved as a "central system." R. p. 54.
On June 9, 2006, Sunnyside's system failed, resulting in raw sewage on the
surface of the drain field. AR, Respondent's Exh. 9; R., p. 55. EIPHD granted
Sunnyside a permit to provide emergency remediation, under the condition that the
repaired system would be temporary and must be abandoned once a permanent system
had been approved and installed. AR, Respondent's Exh. 8. After a meeting with the
City of Idaho Falls, EIPHD set a deadline of July 7,2006 for Sunnyside to provide proof
that the raw sewage had been cleaned and that septic tank pumping was being
maintained. AR, Respondent's Exh. 9. EIPHD also determined that the only options
available for appellants were either to connect to the City of Idaho Falls' facilities or
install a large soil absorption central system, or central system, that met the flow needs of
the subdivision, and set a deadline of July 7,2006 for Sunnyside to provide a timeline for
completion of either permanent solution to the problem.
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Id.

On September 21,2006, Kelly Eager ("Eager"), Environmental Health
Director for EIPHD, sent Sunnyside a "Notice of Intent to Reimpose Sanitary
Restrictions" since no permanent correction had taken place as requested. AR,
Petitioners' Exh. S. Eager's letter fiu-ther noted that EIPHD would issue a certificate of
disapproval after notice and an opportunity to appeal.

B.

Id.

Administrative History.
Sunnyside filed a Notice of Appeal from the Notice of Intent to Reimpose

Sanitary Restrictions on October 27,2006. On November 28,2006, EIPHD Director
Richard 0 . Home ("Home") issued a decision affirming the decision to re-impose
sanitary restrictions. AR, Doc. 9. Horne stated that EIPHD "intends to re-impose
sanitary restrictions . . . unless Sunnyside complies with applicable rules by the
installation of an approved 'Central System' . . . or connecting to an approved 'Public
System[.]"'

Id. Horne noted that the "issue"

was that "Sunnyside has not complied with

the conditions upon which sanitary restrictions were signed off on the plat by installing

an approved Central Septic System for this subdivision."

Id.

On December 20,2006 Sunnyside appealed to the District Seven Board of
Health. At the conclusion of the June 2 1,2007 hearing, Connnissioner Robert Cope
recommended the motion to affirm re-imposition of sanitary restrictions include the
following understanding:
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I think what the actual motion should state is that we would move to
uphold the sanitary restrictions but refer the applicant to DEQ for a remedy.
Because I think the large system comes under DEQ's purview. The
existing system that we have a restriction on is ours. . . .

....

[I]t looks like, from the definition we have here of central and
municipal systems coming under the authority of DEQ -

.. . .

--it would occur that the remedy to their problem is going to be
DEQ's responsibility, but the restrictions on the current system are our
responsibility.
June 21,2007 Hearing Tr., p. 58,11, 1-7, 12-14, 16-19. Commissioner Cope's
recommendation was then seconded by Commissioner Radford and Dr. Barbara Nelson.
Id p. 58,11.20-23. With the understanding that DEQ could provide the remedy but

d,

EIPHD was still responsible for placing restrictions on Sunnyside's system, the
Commissioners upheld the re-imposition.

Id.,p. 61,ll. 6-17.

EIPHD subsequently issued

a Certificate of Disapproval on February 2,2007, and a Corrected Certificate on March
29,2007. AR, Docs. 13 & 14.

C.

Procedural History.
On February 21,2007, Sunnyside filed a "Petition for Declaratory

Judgment and Judicial Review" ("Petition"). R. p. 5. The Petition specifically requested
the following relief:
(1) a declaratoryjudgment that the Memorandum of Understanding
("MOLJ") established that District Seven only had jurisdiction over
individuallsubsurface sewage systems and not central septic systems, which
appellants claimed they were operating;
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 4

(2) a declaratory judgment estopping District Seven from reimposing sanitary restrictions and stating "that the construction was in
compliance with approved plans and specifications, and that the facilities
substantially complied with regulatory standards in effect at the time of
facility construction";
(3) judicial review of the decisions of District Seven re-imposing
sanitary restrictions under Idaho Code $67-5279(3); and, accordingly,
(4) an order setting aside the Certificate of Disapproval dated
February 1,2007; and
(5) a finding that the decisions of District Seven were "entered
without a reasonable basis in fact or law and that Plaintiffs are entitled to
their reasonable attorney fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses."

On September 24,2007, the District Court for the County of Bonneville,
Hon. District Judge Joel C. Tingey, issued a Memorandum Decision and Order. R. p.
100. After setting forth the applicable standard for judicial review of an agency action,

R. p. 102-04, the Court stated that "the sole issue . . . is whether District Seven's actions
were in excess of its statutory authority. I.C. $ 67-5279(3)(h)." R. p. 104. The Court
determined that, pursuant to Idaho Code $ 50-1326, DEQ was statutorily given the
authority for re-imposing sanitary restrictions. R. p. 105. However, DEQ was granted
authority to delegate duties to public health districts. R. p. 106. Pursuant to the MOU,
DEQ had granted public health districts authority over Individual/Subsurface Sewage
Disposal Systems, but had retained general authority over "central systems."

Id. Since

the septic system utilized by the appellants "fell within the definition of a central
system[,]" and the MOU reserved to DEQ the authority to "reimpose sanitary restrictions
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 5

for water and sewer systems under DEQ's responsibility[,]" the Court determined that
EIPHD's issuance of a Certificate of Disapproval and its re-imposition of sanitary
restrictions were without authority. R. p. 106-08. The Court further held that the
Certificate of Disapproval, Corrected Certificate of Disapproval, and re-imposition of
restrictions were null and void. R. p. 108.

D.

Sunnyside's Motion for Attorney Fees.
On October 5,2007, Sunnyside filed a Motion for Attorney Fees pursuant

to Idaho Code $5 12-117 and 12-121. R. p. 112-12. EIPHD objected, arguing that fees
under section 12-117 were inappropriate as EIPHD was not "a state agency, a city, a
county or other taxing district[.]" R. p. 112-21. EIPHD further objected to Sunnyside's
request for fees under section 12-121, as Sunnyside's "Petition for Declaratory Judgment
and Judicial Review" did not constitute a "civil action." R. p. 112-22.
On November 1,2007, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision
and Order on Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees. R. p. 164. The Court held that it was
the legislative intent that health districts were not state agencies, but were instead
"governmental entities whose creation has been authorized by the state, much in the
manner of other single purpose districts." R. p. 165. Accordingly, the Court held that
attorney fees were not authorized under section 12-117. Id. The Court also held that it
would "decline to award attorney fees under 5 12-117 inasmuch as the Court does not
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believe that the actions of EIPHD were without a reasonable basis in fact or law." ISj, As
Sunnyside's tank was overflowing and sewage was pooling on the surface of the
property, the Court noted that there was a reasonable basis in fact for re-imposing
sanitary restrictions. R. p. 165-66. Furthermore, the Court held that while Idaho Code $
39-414(2)-which

granted health districts a general power to "do all things required for

the preservation and protection of public health"-does

not supplant specific authority

granted to DEQ to re-impose sanitary restrictions on central systems, it nevertheless
formed a legal basis for EIPHD's actions. R. p. 166.
Regarding Idaho Code $ 12-121, the Court mentioned the "substantial
amount of case law holding that a judicial review and appeal of an administrative agency
ruling does not constitute a 'civil action' for purposes of allowing attorney fees under I.C.

$ 12-121." R. p. 167. The Court noted that one decision, Allen v. Blaine County, 131
Idaho 137, 140-41,953 P.2d 578 (1998) had mentioned in dicta the "possibility" that a
declaratoryjudgment action attacking an agency decision could be considered a "civil
action" for purposes of $ 12-121.

Id. It nevertheless determined that it did not need to

address whether or not Sunnyside's "Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Judicial
Review" was a civil action. Id. As the Court had already found that EIPHD's actions
were not taken without a reasonable basis in fact or law, the Court further found that the
matter had not been "brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonable, or without
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foundation." R. p. 167. The Court did, however, grant Sunnyside its costs in a judgment
issued on November 1,2007. R. p. 169. Sunnyside did not appeal the Court's
Memorandum Decision and Order or its Judgment of Costs until 82 days after they were
issued, on January 22,2008. R. p. 201.
On November 14,2007, Sunnyside filed a Motion to Reconsider Denial of
Attorney Fees. R. p. 170-1. In its December 10,2007 Memorandum Decision and Order
for Reconsideration, the Court upheld its previous ruling that a health district is not a
state agency for purposes of granting attorney fees under section 12-117. R. p. 200-2.
The Court further ruled that a petition seeking judicial review and declaratory judgment
is not a "civil action" for purposes of section 12-121. R. p. 200-3. The Court found that
the relief sought by Sunnyside was available on judicial review regardless of whether the
petition included a request for declaratoryjudgment. R. p. 200-4. Ultimately, the Court
found that "the action initiated by Petitioners, regardless of its label, was an appeal of an
administrative decision. As an appeal, 5 12-121 does not apply." Id.
Sunnyside appealed both the November 1,2007 and December 10,2007
decisions of the District Court regarding attorney fees on January 22,2008. R. p. 201.
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11. ARGUMENT

A.

Standard of Review on Appeal.
The appellate court exercises free review over the decision of a district

court applying Idaho Code 5 12-117. Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349,356,
109 P.3d 1091 (2005).
The district court's decision to award attorney fees under Idaho Code $ 12121 is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Stout v. Key Training Corn., 144
Idaho 195, 196, 158 P.3d 97 1 (2007). However, when an award of attorney fees depends
on the interpretation of a statute, the standard of review for statutory interpretation
applies. Id. "The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which [the] Court
exercises free review." Id.
B.

Attorney Fees under Idaho Code 5 12-117.
Idaho Code 8 12-117 provides for an award of attorney fees under the

following conditions:
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or
civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city,
a county or other taxing district and a person, the court shall award the
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable
expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment is
rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
(4) For the purposes of this section:

....
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(b) "State agency" shall mean any agency as defined in section 675201, Idaho Code.
Section 67-5201 gives the following definition of "agency":
(2) "Agency" means each state board, commission, department or
officer authorized by law to make rules or to determine contested cases, but
does not include the legislative or judicial branches, executive officers
listed in section 1, article IV, of the constitution of the state of Idaho in the
exercise of powers derived directly and exclusively from the constitution,
the state militia or the state board of correction.
EIPHD does not dispute that Sunnyside was the prevailing party in its
action for judicial review. Accordingly, the Court must determine (1) whether EIPHD, a
public health district, is a "state agency;" and (2) whether EIPHD acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law. If the Court concludes either determination in the
negative, it should then find that Sunnyside is not entitled to attorney fees under Idaho
Code § 12-117.
I.

Sunnyside is not entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code 6 12-117
as EIPHD is not a state agencv or enumerated governmental entity.

Sunnyside do not contend that EIPHD is a "city, a county, or other taxing
district[.]" As such, EIPHD will only address whether it is a "state agency."

An "agency" under 5 67-5201 is a "state entity empowered to affect an
individual's legal rights or duties." Petersen v. Franklin County, 130 Idaho 176, 182,938
P.2d 1214 (1997) (citing Michael S. Gilmore & Dale D. Goble, a e Idaho Administratioiz
Procedure's Act: A Primer for the Practitioner, 30 IDAHOL. REV. 273,282 (1993)). By
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the plain language of the statute, only state government entities are agencies. The Idaho
Supreme Court has held that the definition of "agency" under $ 67-5201 indicates that it
is intended to apply to "state administrative agencies, and not local governing bodies."
Idaho Historic Preservation Council, Inc. v. Citv Council of Citv of Boise, 134 Idaho
651, 653, 8 P.3d 646 (2000). Therefore, for example, county or city governments do not
fall within the definition of "agency'3n $ 67-5201, Gibson v. Ada County Sheriffs

m,139 Idaho 5,7,72 P.3d 845 (2003); neither does a city council, Idaho Historic
Preservation Council, 134 Idaho 651,654, 8 P.3d 646; a county board of commissioners,
Petersen, 130 Idaho at 182,938 P.2d at 1220; Arthur v. Shoshone County, 133 Idaho 854,
859,993 P.2d 617 (Ct. App. 2002); or a Board of Trustees for a school district, Smith v.
Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714,721-22,918 P.2d 583 (1996).
EIPHD was established pursuant to Idaho Code $ 39-401 &

This

statute provides that EIPHD and the other public health districts created pursuant to the
statute are not "state agencies":
The various health districts, as provided for in this chapter, are not a single
department of state government unto themselves, nor are they a part of any
of the twenty (20) departments of state government authorized by section
20, article IV, Idaho constitution, or of the departments prescribed in
section 67-2402. Idaho Code.
It is legislative intent that health districts operate and be recognized not as
state agencies or departments, but as governmental entities whose creation
has been authorized by the state, much in the manner as other single
purpose districts. Pursuant to this intent, and because health districts are
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 11

not state departments or agencies, health districts are exempt from the
required participation in the services of the purchasing agent or employee
liability coverage, as rendered by the department of administration.
However, nothing shall prohibit the health districts from entering into
contractural [contractual] arrangements with the department of
administration, or any other department of state government or an elected
constitutional officer, for these or any other services.

....

This section merely affirms that health districts created under this chapter
are not state agencies, and in no way changes the character of those
agencies as they existed prior to this act.
Sunnyside erroneously claims that the "purpose" of section 39-401 is to exempt public
health districts from "participation in the services of the purchasing agent or employee
liability coverage, as rendered by the department of administration." IDAHO
CODE$39401. The statute, however, does not state that the exemption is its "purpose." The sole
purpose of the statute is to "affirm[] that health districts created under this chapter are not
state agencies[.]" Id. It is only "pursuant" to the legislahue's intent and "because health
districts are not state departments or agencies" that they receive the exemption mentioned
in the statute. Section 39-401 need not, as Sunnyside insists, state that the legislature
intends to "exempt the health districts from having to pay attorney fees[.]" App. Br., p.
13. Because EIPHD is "not [a] state agenc[ylWunder section 39-401, it is likewise not a
"state agency" under section 12-117 or a "state board, commission, department or
officer" under section 67-5201.
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Instead, public health districts are "governmental entities whose creation
has been authorized by the state, much in the manner as other single purpose districts."
IDAHOCODE$ 39-401. The language of section 39-401 is repeated with respect to the
Idaho Digital Learning Academy ("IDLA") in Idaho Code 533-5502 (stating that the
IDLA is to "operate and be recognized not as a state agency or department, but as a
governmental entity whose creation has been authorized by the state, much in the manner
as other single purpose districts"); and the Idaho State Independent Living Council in
Idaho Code $ 56-1201 (same). A non-exhaustive list of other "single purpose districts"
include school districts ($5 33-301 @ m);
regional airport authorities ($5 21-801 @

m);cemetery maintenance districts ($5 27-101 @ &;

fire protection districts ($5 31-

1401 a m ) ; ambulance districts ($5 3 1-3908 @ seq.);regional solid waste disposal
districts ($$ 3 1-4901 a m ) ; recreation districts ($5 31-4301 a m ) ; library districts ($5
33-2701 am);hospital districts ($$39-1301 @seq.); mosquito abatement districts ($5
39-2801 @ m ) ; highway districts (5s 40-1301

a)
water
; and sewer districts ($$ 42-

3201 a m ) ; irrigation districts ($5 43-101 @ m ) ; and auditorium districts (5s 674901). See Michael C. Moore, fie Idaho Constitution & Local Gover~ments- Selected
Topics, 31 IDAHOL. Rw.417,422 & n. 29 (1995). Most numerous among these are
likely school districts. However, a school district is not an "agency" under the
Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), Idaho Code $ 67-5201,
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w,128 at 72 1-22,

and is likewise not a "state agency" under Idaho Code 12-117(3)(b). Rogers v.
Gooding Pub. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 23 1, 135 Idaho 480,485,20 P.3d 16 (2001) (holding,
however, that a school district is a "taxing district" under section 12-117). See also
IDAHO CODE5 3 1-4903 (stating that regional solid waste disposal districts "shall not be
deemed to be an agency of the state of Idaho nor of any of its political subdivisions").
"State agency" analysis under section 12-117 does not appear to have been applied to
other single purpose districts named above, but "as governmental entities whose creation
has been authorized by the state7'and "not as state agencies or departments," there is no
reason to believe that Courts would treat them any differently.
EIPHD does not dispute that, technically speaking, it is "authorized by law
to . . . determine contested cases[.]" IDAHOCODE5 67-5201(2). However, rulemaking
authority is only part of the definition. Only state government entities are "agencies"
under the APA. Petersen,130 Idaho at 182. In contrast, the legislature created "public
health districts" as, explicitly, not "state agencies or departments[.]" See IDAHOCODE$5
39-401,39-408. The current name, "Eastern Idaho Public Health District," is therefore
more in line with the statutory creation of "public health districts" than was "District
Seven Health Department." In fact, if public health districts are not "state agencies,"
IDAHOCODE $39-401, district health departments and district boards of health are even
more removed from a state agency as they are created and established within "each public

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 14

health district." IDAI-10 CODE§ 39-409. Ultimately, Sunnyside's undue emphasis on the
name of the public health district is not as important as the fact that section 39-401
clearly establishes that public health districts are not state agencies or departments. There
is no way around this fact.
Sunnyside's reliance upon the Court's application of 12-117 to "the
activities of an agency or other enumerated governmental entity" in Rincover v. State,
Dept. of Finance, 132 Idaho 547, 550,976 P.2d 473 (1999) to establish an "irreconcilable
conflict" is unavailing. If the governmental entity is "enumerated" as Rincover suggests,
it must be so in an applicable statute. Only section 67-5201(2) "enumerates" the
"governmental entities" to which section 12-117 apply, including a "state board,
commission, department or officer[.]" EIPHD is clearly none of the above.
The proper characterization of a health district is as a "governmental
entit[y] whose creation has been authorized by the state, much in the manner as other
single purpose districts" and "not as [a] state agenc[y] or department[]." IDAHOCODE $
39-401. Sunnyside has given no reasons for its claim that EIPHD is a state agency (other
than stating that it has some mlemaking authority) and simply glosses over the clear
language of the enabling statute. EIPHD has never claimed that it is a state agency, nor
could it ever be so under the current statutory framework. Since EIPHD is not a state
agency, Sunnyside is not entitled to attorney fees under section 12-117.
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2.

Sunnvside is not entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code 4 12-117
as EIPHD did not act without a reasonable basis in fact or law.

Attorney fees are awardable under section 12-117 in cases involving a state
agency "if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted
without a reasonable basis in fact or law." When an agency "has no authority to take a
particular action, it acts without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Univ. of Utah Hosp.
v. Ada Countv Bd. of Commr's, 143 Idaho 808,812,153 P.3d 1154 (2007). However, if
an agency's actions are based upon a "reasonable, but erroneous interpretation of an
ambiguous statute," then attorney fees should not be awarded. Ralph Naylor Farms. LLC
v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806, 809 172 P.3d 1081 (2007). Attorney fees are
inappropriate if the issue is one of first impression, or if the entity presented a legitimate
question for the Court to address. Lane Ranch v. Citv of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 175
P.3d 776 (2007); State Dep't of Finance v. Resource Service Co., Inc., 134 Idaho 282,
284, 1 P.3d 783 (1999). The statute focuses on the "overall action" of the state agency.
State Dev't of Finance, 134 Idaho 282; Rincover v. State, Dev't of Finance, 132 Idaho
547,976 P.2d 473 (1999); Rincover v. State. Dev't of Finance, 129 Idaho 442,926 P.2d
626 (1996). The purpose of section 12-117 is two-fold: "(1) to serve as a deterrent to
groundless or arbitrary agency action; and (2) to provide a remedy for persons who have
borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless charges or
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attempting to correct mistakes agencies never should ha[ve] made." Rincover, 132 Idaho
at 549.
In this case, the District Court properly recognized a substantial factual
basis for re-imposing sanitary restrictions. "Specifically, there is no dispute that the
Petitioner's septic tank was overflowing causing sewage to pool on the surface of the
property. Such a condition would create a public health concern reasonably prompting
some action on the part of EIPHD." R. p. 165-66. The factual bases for re-imposing
sanitary restrictions were extremely serious. Sunnyside does not dispute the fact that
their act of connecting I I commercial buildings to a system permitted for "1 or 2" was
invariably the cause of the hazardous sewage spill. AR, Doc. 16,T 6.
Due to such circumstances, EIPHD reasonably felt compelled to act.
EIPHD had a general statutory power to "do all things required for the preservation and
protection of public health." IDAHO CODE5 39-414(2). EIPHD reasonably believed that
its clear authority over individual systems included Sunnyside's system, which was
installed in 1996 as an individual subsurface sewage disposal system for "1 or 2
commercial office buildings[.]" AR, Pet. Exh. C. Since EIPHD was responsible for
lifting sanitary restrictions in conjunction with Sunnyside's application for subdivision
approval, and Sunnyside had never been approved for a "central system," EIPHD
therefore reasonably believed that Sunnyside needed approval of a "central septic
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system" in order for their system to be regarded as such. EIPHD also reasonably
believed tbat it was the "responsible agency" to "re-impose sanitary restrictions for water
and sewer systems" for which it had originally lifted sanitary restrictions. R. p. 39. The
District Court ultimately disagreed, holding that "the status of Petitioners' septic tank as a
"central system" is not conditioned upon whether it is operating properly or is perceived
to be in compliance with applicable pennit requirements or regulations." R. p. 106.
EIPHD reasonably believed, however erroneously, that it had authority to
re-impose sanitary restrictions. As noted by the District Court, District Seven personnel
including Home and other board members recognized DEQ's general authority over
central systems. However, after reasonably evaluating authority in both statute and the
MOU, EXPHD officials believed tbat Sunnyside's system was not a central system and
they reasonably supported the re-imposition of sanctions.
EIPHD's authority, accordingly, presented a legitimate question for the
District Court to determine. This was not a situation in which EIPHD acted with
knowledge of lack of any authority. EIPHD reasonably believed that their general
statutory authority to do all things necessary for the protection of the public health and
their authority to initially lift sanitary restrictions meant they had the authority to reimpose sanitary restrictions under the version of the DEQ MOU then applicable. EIPHD
ultimately was proven wrong, but their actions had a reasonable factual basis and were
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not completely "groundless or arbitrary." Accordingly, Sunnyside is not entitled to
attorney fees under $ 12-117.

C.

Attorney Fees under Idaho Code 5 12-121.
Appellants argue they are entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho

Code $ 12-121, which states:
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to
the prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter,
repeal or amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of
attorney's fees. The term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any
person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state
of Idaho or political subdivision thereof.
The award of attorney fees pursuant to $ 12-121 is governed by Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(e):
Attorney Fees. In any civil action the court may award
(1)
reasonable attorney fees, which at the discretion of the court may include
paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule
54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by any statute or contract. Provided,
attorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the
court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation; but attorney fees shall not be awarded pursuant to section 12121, Idaho Code, on a default judgment.

Idaho Code $ 12-121 allows a court to award attorney fees to the prevailing
party in any civil action. Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710,717, 170 P.3d 375,382
(2007). Again, EIPHD does not dispute that Sunnyside was the prevailing party in its
action for judicial review. Accordingly, the Court must determine (1) Sunnyside's
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 19

Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Judicial Review was a "civil action;" and (2)
whether all defenses asserted by EIPHD were, as a whole, defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation. If the Court concludes either determination in the
negative, it should then find that Sunnyside is not entitled to attorney fees under Idaho
Code 5 12-121.
1.

Sunwside is not entitled to attornev fees under Idaho Code (1 12-121
as the Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Judicial Review was
not a "civil action."

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, for purposes of attorney fees under

5 12-121, a "civil action" is an action "commenced" by filing a complaint with a court.
Sanchez v. State Dept. of Correction, 143 Idaho 239, 141 P.3d 1108 (2006). A
"complaint" may be "denominated as a complaint, petition or application[.]" Driver v. SI

h,
139 Idaho 423,429,80 P.3d 1024 (2003) (citing Rule 3(a) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure). However, for an action to be a civil action within the meaning of Rule
3(a) and Idaho Code 5 12-121, it must be "commenced" by the filing of a "complaint."
Id. "Therefore, no matter what the characterization of the action, it appears that it must

commence by a filing having the characteristics of a complaint for these provisions to
apply." Id.
Sunnyside fails to grasp the fact that the action must "commence" by the
filing of a "complaint" with the "court." IDAHO
R. CIV.P. 3(a). "Commence" is not
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defined by Rule 3(a), but is commonly understood to mean "to initiate," or to "begin."
456 (1966). Hence, the court in
WEBSTER'STIiIRD NEWINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
Sanchez concluded that 5 12-121 does not authorize an award of attorney fees in a
judicial review of an administrative proceeding. Sanchez, 143 Idaho at 243 (holding that
appeal from decision of Idaho Personnel Commission was not a "civil action"). See also
Staff of Idaho Real Estate C o m ' n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630,22 P.3d 105 (2001)
(judicial review of decision of Idaho Real Estate Commission); Johnson v. Idaho Central
Credit Union, 127 Idaho 867,908 P.2d 560 (1995) (judicial review of denial of claim for
unemployment benefits brought before Idaho Industrial Commission); Knight v. Dev't of
Ins., State of Idaho, 119 Idaho 591,808 P.2d 1336 (Ct. App. 1991) (judicial review of
decision of Department of Insurance); World Cup Ski Shop, Inc. v. Citv of Ketchum, 118
Idaho 294,796 P.2d 171 (Ct. App. 1990) (judicial review of administrative ruling of
Ketchum's Planning and Zoning Commission); Lowerv v. Bd. of Countv Commr's for
Ada County, 117 Idaho 1079,793 P.2d 1251 (1990) (judicial review from action of a
board of county commissioners).
The underlying action in this case was undeniably commenced at the
administrative level on October 27, 2006 by Petitioners' letter indicating a Notice of
Appeal from the decision of Kellye Eager to re-impose sanitary restrictions on
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Sunnyside, and not as a compla.intbefore a district court. AR, Doc. 3. Only on appeal
from the decision of the Board of Health was the case brought before a "court."
Sunnyside relies on the decision in Bogner v. State Dept. of Revenue and

, .Tax I07 Idaho 854,693 P.2d 1056 (1984) for the position that, if a party filed a
complaint against an administrative ruling, rather than an "appeal," attorney fees should
be allowed under section 12-121. App. Br. pp. 18-19. This argument is tenuous at best.
This Court in Lowery explained that Boaner was unusually "initiated by filing a
complaint'' and "must be read in light of those facts." 117 Idaho 1079, 1082. Bogner "is
not authority for awarding of attorney fees in an administrative ruling appeal."

Id.

Justice Bistline's concurrence in Lowery gave insight into the unusual circumstances of
Bogner:
Bogner . . . was a one-of-a-kind case, and accordingly can have little
precedential effect. . . . It was an appeal to the district court and it was
initiated by the filing of a complaint. Footnote 4 of Bogner, 107 Idaho at
857,693 P.2d at 1059, sets out the provisions of I.C. $ 63-3049, which as
applicable are synopsized to inform that a Tax Commission final
assessment (following redetermination) "may be reviewed" in the district
court of the taxpayer's county of residence, or in Ada County "by a
complaint" which is timely filed, provided that the taxpayer shall have first
paid the tax. The same statute provides that the district court decision may
be appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. Bogner was a highly unusual
procedural circumstance, and neither of the litigants in the present action
cited it.

Id. at 1082-83 (citation omitted). This Court should not view the Bogner decision as
anything more than that explained by Justice Bistline's dissent.
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Sunnyside's emphasis on the "declaratory judgment" portion of their
petition for judicial review elevates form over substance, and does not rely upon any
good law. The case of Allen v. Blaine CounQ, 131 Idaho 138,953 P.2d 578 (1998)
(which Sunnyside mistakenly refers to as "State v. Christensen") does not support
Sunnyside's proposition.
In &,

the Allens filed a complaint requesting judicial review of Blaine

County's denial of their application for approval to build a rental home on their leased
property.

Id.at 139-40. The Allens also filed a declaratory judgment under the Uniform

Declaratory Judgment Act, declaring that plat restrictions were null and void as applied to
them.

Id.at 140. The district court denied the Allens' claims on a motion for summary

judgment, and granted summary judgment to the County.

Id. On appeal, the Idaho

Supreme Court upheld the district court ruling and further declared that attorney fees
under section 12-121 would not be awarded.

Id.at 142. The Court stated:

"Attorney

fees under I.C. § 12-121 are not available to parties in an appeal from an agency decision
because it is not 'a civil action . . . commenced by filing a complaint with the court."
The Court's next discussion concerning the declaratory judgment action-upon
Sunnyside hangs its hat-can

which

best be described as dicta:

However, under the IDAPA, a party aggrieved by a final agency
action may file a petition for review or a declaratoryjudgment in the
appropriate district court after exhausting all administrative remedies. Even
if the Court were to treat the petition for a declaratoryjudgment as a
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Id.

"complaint," constituting a civil action, as contemplated by I.C. 5 12-121,
an award of attorney fees would not be appropriate. The main issue on
appeal involved the statutory interpretation of a term under chapter 13, title
50 of the Idaho Code, which this Court had not construed. The law in this
area was not well settled. Accordingly, no attorney fees are awarded.
Id. at 143.
&
n

has never been cited for the proposition that a "declaratory judgment"

concerning the actions of a governmental entity on review from a decision by that entity
constitutes a "civil action." Since

u,
however, this Court has repeatedly addressed

appeals from administrative bodies, and has stated that "no matter what h e
characterization of the action, it appears that it must commence by a filing having the
characteristics of a complaint[.]"

m,139 Idaho at 429.

Sunnyside's "Petition" does not have these characteristics. Sunnyside
erroneously implies that the declaratory relief it sought was somehow new at the district
court setting, as if it were akin to a "complaint." But both of Sunnyside's prayers for
"declaratory judgment" had been made previously. In their December 19,2006 Notice of
Appeal of Director Horne's decision, Sunnyside argued both that EIPHD lacked
jurisdiction to re-impose sanitary restrictions on central systems under DEQ's
responsibility, and that sanitary restrictions could not be re-imposed as construction was
in compliance with approved plans and specifications and substantially complied with
regulatory standards in effect at the time of construction.
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AR, Doc. l 0 , l l a, d & e.

Sunnyside asked the Board of Health to find the same and withdraw the Notice of Intent
to re-impose sanitary restrictions. AR, Doc. 10, q/ c. The Board of Health ultimately
ruled against him on both grounds, and Sunnyside appealed.
The requests in Sunnyside's Petition more appropriately fit within the type
of relief available on judicial review under $67-5279. In paragraph 4, Sunnyside states
the basis for its Petition: "Plaintiffs are parties aggrieved by a final Order of Defendant's
Board of Health entered in a contested case and Plaintiffs are entitled to judicial review
of such Order pursuant to IDAPA 04.11.01.790 and Idaho Code $ 67-5270." (R. p. 6).
The Petition then continues by stating: "The Order appealed from is not a preliminary,
procedural or intermediate agency action or ruling." Id.
The basis for Sunnyside's appeal-IDAPA

04.1 1.01.790-states

as follows:

"Pursuant to Section 67-5270, Idaho Code, any party aggrieved by a final
order of an agency in a contested case may appeal to district court.
Pursuant to Section 67-527 1, Idaho Code, a person is not entitled to judicial
review of an agency action in district court until that person has exhausted
all administrative remedies available with the agency. . . ."
Idaho Code $ 67-5270 also states that "[a] person aggrieved by a final order in a
contested case decided by an agency . . . is entitled to judicial review under this chapter."
And that was exactly the way the District Court viewed the matter on
appeal. Judge Tingey stated that "the sole issue . . . is whether District Seven's actions
were in excess of its statutory authority. I.C. $ 67-5279(3)(b)." (R. p. 104). Granting
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Sunnyside's third and fourth prayer for relief on judicial review, the Court concluded that
"District Seven's issuance of a Certificate of Disapproval and its reimposition of sanitary
restrictions . . . was without authority" under section 67-5279(3)@) and invalidated the
Certificate of Disapproval and the Corrected Certificate of Disapproval. (R. p. 108). The
district court decision did not "avoid" the need to analyze Sunnyside's prayers for
judicial review as claimed by Sunnyside, it granted judicial review.
In its Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Reconsideration, the
Court stated the following concerning the relief sought by Sunnyside in its Petition:
This Court also finds that the relief sought and obtained by
Petitioners is., that the Health District reimposed sanitary restrictions
without authority, was relief available to Petitioners on judicial review
regardless of whether a petition for judicial review was combined with a
request for declaratoryjudgment. I.C. $ 67-5279. Denoting "declaratory
judgment" in thepetition made no appreciable difference in the Court's
consideration and adjudication of the issues.
(R. p. 200-4).
Sunnyside's case should, in its entirety, be characterized as judicial review
or an "appeal" of the decision of the Board of Health of EIPHD. Even if it were a
"declaratory judgment," it would not be a "civil action" under $ 12-121 as Sunnyside's
"declaratory judgment" claims did not "commence" before the "court." IDAHOR. CIV. P.
3(a). There is no Idaho law supporting the position that claims repeated in a "declaratory
judgment" regarding the actions of a governmental entity on appeal from a decision by
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that entity constitute a "civil action." Sunnyside's Petition was clearly an appeal, termed
as "judicial review" under the APA. As such, Sunnyside is not entitled to attorney fees
under 512-121.
2.

Sunnvside is not entitled to attornev fees under Idaho Code 6 12-121
as EIPHD did not defend frivolouslv, unreasonablv or without
foundation.

An award of attorney fees under this statute is not a matter of right to the
prevailing party, but is appropriate only when the court, in its discretion, is left with the
abiding belief that the proceeding was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l); Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549,
559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006). In an action involving multiple claims or defenses,
fees are justified only where all claims brought or defenses asserted are frivolous and
without foundation. Magic Valley Radiologv Assoc., P.A. v. Prof. Bus. Sew., Inc., 119
Idaho 558,808 P.2d 1303 (1991). When deciding whether an action was pursued or
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, the entire course of the
litigation must be taken into account. Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Cow., 140 Idaho
416,95 P.3d 34 (2004). If the action presents mixed issues of law and fact, the court
must determine whether the evidence presented was sufficient to establish a "fairly
debatable" issue under the legal theories advanced, or whether instead the position
advanced was plainly fallacious. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 141 Idaho 537, 112
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P.3d 825 (2005). If there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney fees may not be
awarded under Idaho Code $ 12-121 even though the losing party has asserted factual or
legal claims that may be frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Kiebert v. Goss,
144 Idaho 225, 159 P.3d 862 (2007). The fact a defense fails as a matter of law is not
dispositive of whether it was frivolous or without merit. Turner v. Willis, 119 Idaho
1023,812 P.2d 737 (1991).
EIPHD's lack of authority to re-impose sanitary restrictions was not as
clearly defined as Sunnyside asserts. EIPHD reasonably believed that Sunnyside's
particular system remained under their statutory authority. There was clearly some
confusion concerning whether DEQ oversaw enforcement actions for Sunnyside's
existing system, whether Petitioners' system actually was a "central septic system," and
what authority the MOU granted in conjunction with EIPHD's statutory authority. This
confusion existed even between DEQ and EIPHD, which confusion resulted in
amendments to the MOU.
This does not mean, however, that EIPHD defended the case "frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation." Indeed, the District Court recognized that
"[a]lthough this Court found that such a general grant of power did not supplant specific
granted authority to DEQ to re-impose sanitary restrictions, it nevertheless forms a legal
basis for EIPHD's action. Furthermore. the record establishes a course of conduct
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between EIPHD and the Department of Environmental Quality arguably justifying its
action in re-imposing sanitary restrictions." R. p. 166. EIPHD believed, however
erroneously, that it had authority over Sunnyside's system since no plans and
specifications for a central septic system had ever been submitted to DEQ because the
permit issued for the existing system was issued by EIPHD and because EIPHD was the
authority that originally lifted the restrictions.
More importantly, even if the court found EIPHD's defense of the authority
position to be unreasonable or frivolous, this case involved multiple claims and defenses
and multiple legal and factual issues. Sunnyside has not shown, nor could they prove,
that "[tlhe total defense of a party's proceedings" were unreasonable or frivolous.
Vallev Radiology, 119 Idaho at 563. This is the standard. Sunnyside argued in their
Petition not only that EIPHD lacked authority, but that (a) their system was in
compliance with approved plans, (b) there was no factual basis for EIPHD's reimposition of sanctions, and (c) EIPHD violated § 67-5279(3). R. p. 10-13. Sunnyside
also made several factual allegations that were vigorously disputed by EIPHD. R. p. 510. All of EIPHD's defenses-and

each defense in particular-were

not "plainly

fallacious" throughout the entire course of the litigation. United Investors Life Ins. Co. v.
Severson, 143 Idaho 628, 151 P.3d 824 (2007). EIPHD's defenses instead presented

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 29

"legitimate, triable issues of fact" which were, at the very least, "fairly debatable" under
the law. Kiebert, 144 Idaho at 228; Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 141 Idaho at 542.
As Sunnyside has failed to show that the totality of EIPHD's defense was
unreasonable or frivolous, attorney fees are not available under Idaho Code $ 12-121.
D.

Without any statutory basis and without making any argument
therefor, Sunnyside is not entitled to attorney fees on Appeal.

Sunnyside's request for fees on appeal should be denied as it cannot prevail
on either its claim to fees under $ 12-117 or $ 12-121.
Furthermore, in order for Sunnyside to prevail in its claim for attorney fees
on appeal, it must be entitled to these fees by statute. However, as stated above,
Sunnyside is not entitled to fees under either $ 12-117 (as EIPHD is not a "state agency")
and $ 12-121 (as the Petition for judicial review was not a "civil action"). Absent
statutory authority, Sunnyside is not entitled to fees on appeal.
Even if EIPHD were a "state agency," or Sunnyside's Petition was a "civil
action," Sunnyside has not shown that EIPHD has acted on appeal without a reasonable
basis in fact or law, or has defended this appeal frivolously, unreasonably, or without
foundation.
Finally, as Sunnyside has not presented the Court any argument in support
of their contention that they are entitled to fees under $ 12-117 and $ 12-121 on appeal,
they have not complied with Appellate Rule 35(a)(6). When a party requesting attorney
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 30

fees on appeal cites statutory authority but does not present argument in compliance with
I.A.R. 35(a)(6), the Court will not address the request. Goldman v. Graham, 139 Idaho
945,947, 88 P.3d 764 (2004). Under I.A.R. 35(a)(6), the argument portion of the
appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and
parts of the transcript and record relied upon." I.A.R. 35(a)(6).
Sunnyside's request for attorney fees does not comply with I.A.R. 35(a)(6)
because they failed to provide argument in support of their request. Sunnyside sets out
their request for fees and cites Idaho Code $5 12-117 and 12-121, but do not provide
reasons why they should be awarded attorney fees on appeal. This is Sunnyside's only
mention of fees on appeal, and, according to Goldrnan, it is inadequate. 139 Idaho at
948.
Sddell v. Jenkins, 111 Idaho 857,727 P.2d 1285 (Ct. App. 1986) is not
authority for the proposition that an appellant may receive fees on appeal without any
basis in law or without making any argument. This Court should, accordingly, deny
Sunnyside's bare request for fees on appeal.
Since there is no statutory authority for fees, EIPHD does not request the
same on appeal. However, EIPHD does request its costs under I.A.R. 40.
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111.CONCLUSION
The legislature has clearly defined in what situations attorney fees are
available under Idaho Code §§ 12-117 and 12-121. Sunnyside's appeal of a non-state
agency's administrative decision does not qualify under either statute. This is not the
first time this Court has faced a situation where neither statute applied. See, e.g.*Home
v. Idaho State University, 138 Idaho 700,69 P.3d 120 (2003) (denying fees under 8 12117 as University was not a "state agency," and under § 12-121 as case was an appeal
from Personnel Commission and therefore not a "civil action"). As Sunnyside lacks a
statutory basis for fees, and EIPHD reasonably presented debatable positions before the
district court as to its authority to re-impose sanitary restrictions, the decision of the
District Court should be affirmed, and costs should be awarded to EIPHD.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1 9 ' ~
day of August, 2008.
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT
HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC

Attorneys for Respondents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
on this date served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their
name, either by mailing, hand delivery, or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy
of said document in a properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage
prepaid; by hand delivery to them; or by facsimile transmission.
DATED this lgthday of August, 2008.
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT
HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC

By:

Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
FULLER & CARR
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
P.O. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935
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